










  The analysis so far recognizes the important role of regional integration and/or 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in influencing successful development of 
international production networks (IPNs). Intuitively, one would expect a positive impact 
of reciprocal trade liberalization as it should bring about a reduction of border barriers to 
trade, and make the flows of goods, services and resources easier and cheaper, thus 
allowing further fragmentation of production and efficient allocation of resources. 
However, it turns out that in reality PTAs are not necessarily producing these results due 
to at least two groups of (related) problems. One concerns a transformation of 
agreements’ schedules into actual free and unobstructed trade flows, as it appears that 
many PTAs are not satisfactorily utilized and that a significant portion of trade ends up 
being left out of the liberalization coverage. India only recently started to entertain the 
idea of “substantially all trade” when negotiating the coverage of tariff liberalization. Yet, 
even if all products were on the list for liberalization, there would be problems in 
accessing the market under these liberalized conditions. The most frequent culprit for this 
is found in rules of origin (RoO), so this chapter reviews the substantial empirical 
analyses done under ARTNeT to highlight implications in the case of India.  
  
  The other problematic area is that development of IPNs might not only need 
smooth and open trade channels for goods, but also harmonization of national policies in 
several key areas (for example, competition or investment). It is not clear that current 
PTAs signed by countries, including India, will lead to such integration. We can say 
“might” because the empirical evidence in this area is still inconclusive with regard to the 
causal linkages between regional integration efforts and IPNs. ARTNeT (2011), in 
focusing on a small number of countries and three sectors, summarized extensive 
theoretical literature that pointed to wards the positive linkages between establishment 
and the growth of IPNs and preferential trade agreements, including an increase in parts 
and components trade; however, it failed to find strong empirical evidence about the 
causal direction.
88 Furthermore, WTO (2011a) and literature cited therein found that it 
was deep integration, not just free trade that positively and strongly influenced production 
network trade. It stated that “…on average, signing deep agreements increases trade in 
production networks between member countries by almost 8 percentage points” (p. 146). 
However, the report also acknowledged that it was likely that countries already 
participating in IPNs might be willing, more than others, to sign deep(er) trade 
                                                            
 
88 Given that most of the PTAs examined in that study were implemented very recently, while the IPNs 
explored have been established for longer than a decade, it is not surprising that the study failed to confirm 
that the occurrence of the PTAs could be given credit for the expansion of given IPNs.   
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agreements in order to secure stable environment for the growth of these IPNs. Thus, the 
direction of causality between signing deep agreements and the amount of production 
network trade (in essence, trade in parts and components or intermediate goods) needs 
further scrutiny. One of the difficulties is the definition and measurement of “deep” 
integration. Following Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir (2010), WTO (2011a) developed a 
methodology to measure the depth of the integration achieved through PTAs; later in this 
chapter the findings of the report are used to comment on the state of India’s efforts in 
forging preferential trade deals supportive of production network trade as well as the 
expansion of vertical specialization more generally.  
 
1. India’s campaign for preferential trading deals 
 
  In 1995, India had no bilateral reciprocal preferential trade agreement, but it was a 
member of the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), (then known as the Bangkok 
Agreement), South Asia Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) and Global System of 
Trade Preferences (GSTP). The first bilateral free trade agreement was signed in 1998 
with Sri Lanka; from then until the end of 2011, India signed another nine bilateral and 
two plurilateral agreements.
89   Figure 35 reflects how this proliferation of trade 
agreements signed by India has resulted in a “noodle bowl” phenomenon – the tangle of 
relationships created by multiple overlapping trading arrangements. With 15 trade 
agreements already in implementation,
90 India is well ahead of the Asia-Pacific region’s 

















89 A full list of other agreements under negotiations are available from the Department of Commerce online 
information, “Trade: International Trade: Other Agreements/Negotiations” at http://commerce.nic.in/ 
trade/international_ta.asp or from www.uneascap.org/tid/aptiad.  
90 This number excludes SAPTA since it has been superseded by SAFTA, even though SAPTA provisions 
are still being implemented. 
91 The average for the region does not include those economies that do not have any PTAs, i.e., Mongolia, 
Palau, Northern Mariana Islands, New Caledonia, Guam, French Polynesia, American Samoa, Timor-Leste 
and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (APTIAD, 2011).   
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Source: Based on “APTIAD noodle bowl”, available online at www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad. 
  
 
As is evident from its negotiating history (see box 1), India initiated several PTAs 
post-2000, starting with signing the framework agreements in 2003 and followed by PTA 
negotiations. Most of these agreements were finally signed during 2009-2010. India has 
embraced regionalism as one of the pillars of its trade policy, which started in early 2000 
and is now materializing. Given the increasing opening of the Indian economy after 1995, 
reciprocal trade arrangements were seen as a tool of obtaining market access for Indian 
exports as a necessity for sustaining further import liberalization and other market-
oriented reforms. Putting more focus on “discriminatory and preferential” liberalization 
coincided with, on one hand, a international Indian presence of competitive business in 














Box 1. Evolution of India’s approach to preferential trade liberalization 
India has stated it is a believer of the rules-based multilateral trading system, and 
historically it has not used PTAs as a trade policy instrument for its economic 
engagements until the early 2000s. India’s regional engagements were mainly guided by 
the political affiliations and traditionally the country followed a cautious and guided 
approach towards PTAs. This can be observed from its engagements in some of the PTAs 
such as the Bangkok Agreement (1975), GSTP (1988) and SAPTA (1993) or the 
agreements with Bhutan and Nepal, which has the political objective of regional 
prosperity. These agreements focused on promoting South-South trade; however, 
intraregional trade remained insignificant.  
While its commitment for regional prosperity and development in South Asia 
started with SAARC, India started looking outside the South Asian region, especially to 
the East, with its “Look East Policy” in 1991. Since India’s major trade interest was to 
the West (the developed world), the “Look East Policy” provided it with an opportunity 
to become a major partner of ASEAN in the areas of trade and investment. Since its 
beginning, the partnership between India and ASEAN has been developing at quite a fast 
pace. India became a sectoral dialogue partner 1992, a full dialogue partner in 1995, a 
member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996 and, finally, a summit level 
partner in 2002. 
India’s initial attention to PTAs started in 2000 after the European Union initiated 
plans for its expansion and the United States supported the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA). India felt that if it did not become a party to a major bloc in all 
likelihood it would be “locked out” of the markets of its major trading partners. It then 
focused on the SAARC, MERCOSUR and ASEAN markets. India’s position in ASEAN 
was further strengthened after ASEAN signed the Framework Agreement with China, as 
most of ASEAN’s members were slightly apprehensive of the economic size of China 
and felt that their engagement with India would serve as a counterbalance.   
    
  In principle, preferential trade negotiations move faster and produce more tailored 
results, and thus are preferred by many stakeholders, than a protracted and, at times, 
frustrating multilateral process. However, the trade disciplines achieved are (not 
unexpectedly) different across agreements in terms of tariff schedules, sector and/or 
product coverage, implementation timelines, customs procedures or other conditions 
important for traders and, most importantly in terms of RoO, that underlie the utilization 
of negotiated concessions. Therefore, it is appropriate to question the existence and size  
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of the net benefits of each additional agreement that has been signed.
92 For the subject 
matter of this study, however, it is very important to understand how RoO, an 
unavoidable part of each PTA, may influence operations of IPNs and related trade and 
investment. 
 
2. Rules of origin 
 
  Rules of origin define the conditions that a product must meet to be deemed as 
originating from the country that has been given preferential access.
93 Historically, the 
raison d’être for RoO has been to prevent loss of tariff revenue by a country granting 
preferential access to its market. This phenomenon is known as trade deflection, whereby 
products from countries that do not have right to preferential access are redirected 
through countries with such access to the partner country, in order to avoid payment of 
the partner country’s customs duties. There are other important objectives that RoO could 
help achieve, including promoting sophistication of domestic production through value 
addition and the provision of incentives to increase trade and investment in a specific region 
(cf. Das and Ratna, 2010). However, in reality, loading RoO with multiple objectives appears 
to have resulted in (a) RoO becoming less transparent, (b) more costly to comply with, and 
(c) in the end, preventing the use of tariff preferences negotiated in the PTAs. It is not rare to 
find that the complexity of RoO is used to both accommodate and conceal protectionist 
intentions. “By attaching multiple criteria for the satisfaction of origin, RoO may be another 
avenue to effectively exclude product groups from a country’s liberalization commitments” 
(Nag and De, 2011).  
  
  Apart from these “policy-driven” reasons for complex setting of the RoO, there is 
another reason. In the world of fragmented production, with multi-stage processes located in 
different countries becoming the normal way of production, it is increasingly difficult to 
ascertain origin to meet the RoO (which originated when the world had different production 
processes). Thus for a country like India which has aspirations and potential to become better 
integrated in vertical and horizontal chains in Asia and globally, the RoO as a policy tool 
becomes very important.  
 
  India applies different preferential RoO that are negotiated with each PTA.
94 A 
brief comparison of RoO characteristics for the agreements that are currently being 
implemented is provided in table 20. As reported in WTO (2011b), so far the most 
important rule used for determining origin is the limit on the foreign content. As table 20 
shows, the range of these maxima is wide, from 30 per cent to 70 Per cent. India also uses 
the rules of sufficient transformation and change in tariff classification to determine 
                                                            
 
92 The “Trade Policy Review on India” (WTO, 2011b) noted that “despite this generally positive view of 
regional agreements, India has some reservations regarding regionalism because of its complexity and 
possible trade diversion”, referring to India’s Ministry of Finance  text of 2011.  
93 This could be through PTAs or other preferential schemes (such as GSP) but the focus here is only on 
PTAs.  
94 WTO document G/RO/N/1, 9 May 1995.  
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origin. There are product-specific RoO for several agreements, with the number of 
products subject to such rules varying greatly among agreements (for example, 180 
products under the SAFTA, 1,780 products under the BTA with the Republic of Korea 
and 380 products under the BTA with Singapore.
95  
 
  The preferential RoO provide incentives for producers to change their forward 
and backward linkages. There are financial incentives (lower or zero tariffs) that 
sometimes may lead to the replacement of cheaper or better-quality inputs from non-
participating members in the PTA by higher-cost inputs from member economies in order 
to qualify for concessional entry. RoO can also adversely influence investment decisions 






























95 Department of Commerce online information, “International Trade: Trade Agreements”, available at: 
http://commerce.nic.in/trade/international_ta.asp?id=2&trade=i. 
96 Another issue related to different RoO criteria for the same country but under different PTAs also is a 
cause of concern as exporters get confused over which one to use and because it gives the customs 




Table 20. Rules of origin under preferential trade agreements 
 
Agreements  Maximum foreign-content requirements  Minimum cumulative local-content requirements 
Regional    
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement 
(APTA) 
55% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 65%)  60% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 50%) 
Global System of Trade 
Preferences (GSTP) 
50% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 60%)  60% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 50%) 
South Asian Free-Trade Areas 
(SAFTA)
a 
60% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 70%; Sri Lanka: 65%) 
and change in tariff heading
97 
50% of the f.o.b. value, 
b and change in tariff heading with a 
minimum 20% being achieved in the exporting member where 
last stage of manufacturing done 
 
South Asia Preferential Trade 
Arrangement (SAPTA) 
60% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 70%)  50% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 40%) with a minimum 20% 
being achieved in the exporting member where last stage of 
manufacturing done 
Bilateral    
Afghanistan  50% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading  40% of the f.o.b. value and 30% of the f.o.b. value
b 
ASEAN
a  65%  of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff sub-
heading
98  
65% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff sub-heading  
Bhutan  n.a.   n.a.  
Chile  60% of the f.o.b. value
c and change in tariff heading  60% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading 
Korea, Rep. of
a  65% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff sub-
heading 
65% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff sub-heading  
MERCOSUR  40% of the f.o.b. value
c  40% of the f.o.b. value 
Nepal  70% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading  n.a. 
Singapore
a  60% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading  60% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading  
Sri Lanka  65% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading  35% of the f.o.b. value and 25% of the f.o.b. value
c with 
change in tariff heading 
Thailand
d  60% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading  40% of the f.o.b. value and change in the tariff heading  
Other preferential areas    
Mauritius, Seychelles, and 
Tonga 
50% of ex-work price of five specific items
e and 75% 
ex-work prices for others 
50% of ex-work price of five specific items
e and 75% ex-work 
prices for others 
Least-developed countries  70% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff 
classification for not wholly produced or obtained 
category  
70% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff classification for 
not wholly produced or obtained category  
Source: WTO, 2011b.  
Note: Rules of origin are not covered under the India-Bhutan preferential trade agreement. 
n.a. =  Not applicable. 
a Product-specific  RoO  apply. 
b Domestic value content in the exporting country. 
c  Foreign contents should not exceed 15% of the f.o.b. value for sets, as defined in General Rule 3 of the HS. 
d Not notified to WTO. 
e Manual sewing and knitting machines (and parts thereof) or those which require less than one quarter of one 
brake-horsepower for their operation; cycles (other than motor cycles) and parts and accessories thereof, excluding rubber 
tyres and tubes; motor cars including taxi-cabs and articles (other than rubber tyres and tubes) to be used as parts and 
accessories thereof; motor omni-buses, chassis of motor omni-buses, motor vans and motor lorries, and parts of 
mechanically propelled vehicles and accessories excluding rubber tyres and tubes; and motor cycles and motor scooters 




97 Change at 4-digit HS/tariff classification between “non-originating inputs” and export product. 




Empirical estimates of the restrictiveness of RoO are still not readily available for 
all PTAs due to their relatively recent establishment as well as the evolving nature of 
some of them. Restrictive RoO inhibit the growth of intra-industry trade, which often is 
closely associated with trade in parts and components inherent to existence of IPNs. 
Complex RoO can harm the natural growth of trade in components, which occurs with 
the process of development in Asian developing countries. Several studies, including 
under ARTNeT, have suggested that Indian RoO are relatively restrictive, both bilateral 
and regional compared to some other agreements in or outside Asia (cf. Nag and De, 
2011, Das and Ratna, 2010). Yet there are signs that this restrictiveness is weakening 
over time.
99  However, as pointed out above, there is no firm empirical evidence to 
suggest if these steps have helped the rise in intraregional trade and investment flows. 
UNCTAD (2003) analysed the India-Sri Lanka FTA and found that, despite being 
restricted to liberalization of goods, it promoted intraregional investments. The report 
attributed this result to the design of RoO in that agreement (see box 2). Today, India is 
the second-largest foreign investor in Sri Lanka, despite not having an investment treaty.  
 
Box 2. India-Sri Lanka free trade agreement and foreign direct investment 
The free trade agreement gives duty-free market access to India and Sri Lanka 
on a preferential basis. Covering 4,000 products, it foresaw a gradual reduction of 
import tariffs during three years for India and eight years for Sri Lanka.  
To qualify for duty concessions in either country, the RoO criteria spelled out 
value-added at a minimum of 35 per cent for eligible imports. For raw materials sourced 
from either country, the value-added component would be 25 per cent.  
The effect? Sri Lankan exports to India increased from US$ 71 million in 2001 
to US$ 168 million in 2002 while India’s exports to Sri Lanka increased from US$ 604 
million to US$ 831 million during the same period. Although the agreement does not 
address investment, it has stimulated new FDI for rubber-based products, ceramics, 
electrical and electronic items, wood-based products, agricultural commodities and 
consumer durables. Because of the agreement, 37 projects are now in operation, with a 
total investment of US$ 145 million. 
_________________ 






99 The change in tariff heading at the 4-digit HS level has now become change in tariff subheading at the 6-
digit HS level, which is less onerous to comply. Similarly, the local/regional value added has been reduced 
from 50 per cent to 35 per cent (or the imported content increased from 50 per cent to 65 per cent).  
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3. Coverage of agreements 
 
  Two-thirds of all India’s agreements in force are with one partner only, just one of 
which is a developed economy (Japan, signed in 2011) and two are high-income 
developing countries (Republic of Korea and Singapore). The remainder form a 
combination of membership in plurilateral (regional) trade agreements (table 21).
100 As in 
the case of other countries in the region, India has also doubled or tripled some of its 
preferential deals by signing bilateral agreements with countries that are also members of 
the regional agreements to which India is a party (e.g., Sri Lanka is in APTA, GSTP, 
SAFTA and BIMSTEC, while Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are in ASEAN). The 
Trade Policy Review of India (WTO, 2011b) states that “tariff concessions under bilateral 
agreements with countries that also belong to regional agreements to which India is a 
party, are generally wider and deeper than those under the regional agreements, and that 
the trader can choose which preference to use. With regard to rules of origin, the 
authorities mentioned that product specific rules of origin are not necessarily the same in 
the bilateral and regional agreements, but that the original criterion for products not 
covered by specific rules has, by and large, been harmonized.” In practice, it appears that 
some work remains to be done to improve the utilization rate of, and utility from the 
Indian PTAs (see, for example, Jha, 2011). 
 
 







Free trade and economic 
integration agreements 
Bilateral trade agreements  3  2  5 
Regional trade agreements  1  1 - 
Country-bloc agreements  1  1 - 
Global (GSTP)  1 -  - 
Total  6  4 5 
 
Source: Based on WTO TPR India 2011, and WTO RTA-IS, available online at www.wto.org.  
Note: Solid shaded cells represent notification through the Enabling Clause, while the striped cell refers to 
notification through GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V.  
 
  Nine out of India’s 15 PTAs are labelled as free trade agreements (or a 
combination of an FTA in goods and economic integration agreements [EIA] in services) 
thus signalling the intention to improve on the multilateral liberalization commitments. 
Appendix III of this book provides full details of the areas covered by PTAs, and a 
summary is presented in figure 2. None of the agreements contain clearly designated 
articles or sections/chapters on labour standards, and only three agreements have included 
                                                            
 
100  India is a member of the Bay of Bengal Initiative on Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic 
Cooperation (BIMSTEC), signed as a Framework Agreement to form a free trade area by 2012. However, 
negotiations are still underway.  
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some provisions related to the environment. The most frequently found provisions (in 12 
agreements) are those on dispute settlement, safeguards and anti-dumping (the latter 
mostly expressing retention of the freedom to use anti-dumping actions as per WTO 
disciplines). Thus, it is clear that most areas covered in the agreements are linked to 
disciplines in goods trade, which supports prevalent opinion that, until recently, India had 
been very much focusing on policy space-related border measures in its PTAs. 
Agreements with provisions in services, intellectual property protection, investment etc. 
are found in a few agreements, mostly with either developed (Japan) or higher-income 
developing partners (Singapore, Republic of Korea and Malaysia). 
 
 
Figure 36. Areas covered




Source: Based on data from WTO RTA-IS, WTO (2011b) and information from the Ministry of Commerce, 
India 
* Mention of the provisions in any of the areas is registered as coverage; obviously, there is a sizable 
variation between agreements in terms of depth of obligations.  
 
  The outline of PTA coverage by PTAs given in figure 36 (and Annex table), while 
illustrative, is not sufficient to assess how deep Indian regional integration efforts really are. 
As mentioned above, since deep integration is found to be increasing network trade and 
enhancing operations of networks, it is important to understand what the components of such 
deep integration are, so that countries can pursue policies in that direction, if so desired.  
 
  In principle, the concept of “deep integration” implies a higher degree of 
integration than achieved simply by a free trade agreement, which is limited to a removal 
of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on trade in goods. The traditional literature on economic 
integration, grades the levels of integration from most shallow (free trade area) to the 
deepest (fiscal and political union) as shown in table 22. Even the common external trade 
policy of the customs union will be deemed as just a step towards deep integration. Only  
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the processes that lead to liberalization in substantively all goods, services and resources, 
accompanied by the development of some institutions to secure harmonization of certain 
policies, will deliver deep integration. 
 
A common market concept could be taken as an example of a fairly deep 
integration. The integration “deepens” based on the expansion of coverage, both in terms 
of policies and institutions necessary for managing harmonized polices. Lawrence (1996) 
suggested that strengthening production networks would require harmonization of those 
national policies facilitating smoother business activities. As harmonized policies also 
lead to a demand for institutions with supranational power, he argued that countries 
would move towards deeper integration in time. More recent literature, summarized in 
WTO (2011a), found that an increase in trade in intermediate products also created 
demand for deeper agreements. 
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  WTO (2011a) expanded on the methodology developed by Horn, Mavroidis 
and Sapir (2010) in order to empirically measure the depth of integration obtainable 
through a country’s PTAs. Box 3 provides some details on the methodology used. A 
derived measure represents two dimensions of integration: (a) an improvement of the 
specific agreement in covering more than just removal/lowering of tariffs, this being 
identified as the lowest common denominator in integration; and (b) an advance in 












Box 3. Methodology for determining depth of integration 
 
The methodology consists of three steps: (a) identification of policy areas 
classified into two groups (WTO+ provisions that are in the current WTO mandate and 
commitments, and WTO-X provisions that are obligations outside the current WTO 
coverage; see the table below for the list of 52 of these policy areas); (b) determining the 
policy areas included in a PTA and legally enforceable (e.g., a policy area would not be 
deemed enforceable if the legal language is unclear or loose); and (c) exploration of how 
much the policy area and its enforceability matters in practice. For a more detailed 
description refer to WTO (2011a).   
 
      WTO+ and WTO-X policy areas in PTAs 
WTO+ areas   WTO-X areas  
PTA industrial goods   Anti-corruption   Health  
PTA agricultural goods   Competition policy   Human rights  
Customs administration   Environmental laws   Illegal immigration  
Export taxes   IPR   Illicit drugs  
SPS measures  Investment measures   Industrial cooperation  
State trading enterprises   Labour market regulation   Information society  
Technical barriers to 
trade   Movement of capital   Mining  
Countervailing 
measures  Consumer protection   Money laundering  
Anti-dumping   Data protection   Nuclear safety  
State aid   Agriculture   Political dialogue  
Public procurement  
Approximation of 
legislation   Public administration  
TRIMS measures  Audio-visual   Regional cooperation  
GATS   Civil protection  
Research and 
technology  
TRIPS   Innovation policies  SMEs 
   Cultural cooperation  Social matters  
   Economic policy dialogue  Statistics  
   Education and training  Taxation  
   Energy  Terrorism  
   Financial assistance  Visa and asylum  
 







The final results show that of all the policy areas tracked, five consistently matter 
to deep integation, and understood to be motivated to promote production networks. In 
other words, these five policies combined within an agreement would contribute most to 
the expansion of production network trade. The five policy areas include measures for 
state trading enterprises (STEs) and TRIPS from the current WTO mandate, and 
competition policy, intellectual property rights and investment from the areas not covered 
by current WTO agreements. The WTO exercise unfortunately contained only seven of 
the India’s 15 PTAs (bilaterals with Chile, the Republic of Korea and Singapore, and 
with ASEAN and MERCOSUR as well as the two plurilaterals of APTA and SAFTA). 
Only the agreements with the Republic of Korea and Singapore were assessed as meeting 
the condition for deep integration.
101 
 
  It is not very difficult to see why these policy areas have important implications 
for production networks. Competition policy provisions – which were proposed for 
inclusion under the WTO mandate as one of the so-called Singapore issues and later 
dropped except for trade facilitation – are there to ensure that abuse of market power does 
not minimize benefits from liberalization. In the economic literature, competition policy 
is often seen as an extension, and in special cases a substitute, for trade and investment 
liberalization policies in goods and services areas. 
 
While not many PTAs have separate competition policy chapters, there are 
numerous competition-related provisions embedded in chapters on other policy areas, 
such as services liberalization (especially financial and telecommunications services), 
investment, intellectual property protection and government procurement chapters. These 
policy areas are responsible for provisions identified in this book and elsewhere as key 
factors for the operation of IPNs (e.g., infrastructural services, protection of investment or 
intellectual property). Another benefit of adding competition policy provisions where 
possible under the PTAs is their non-discriminatory character. As in other policies that 
are part of regulation, it is more costly to design them to be discriminatory among firms 
belonging to different countries than to not do so; therefore, this produces an additional 
pro-competitive effect and improves transparency.  
  Similarly provisions on STEs are meant to remove the potential for trade 
distortion caused by government involvement in the decisions and activities of an 
enterprise. STEs are not a feature of only developing countries; in fact, many developed 
countries nurture STEs in their agriculture and other sensitive sectors, or the areas linked 
also to social and other special government strategies such as food security. For a 
                                                            
 
101  Because India had still not finalized its agreement with Japan at the time of the WTO study, that 
agreement was was not included in the original assessment. Given the features of the agreement, it is 




multiplicity of reasons, operations of STEs appear to suffer from low transparency. 
Opening this policy area through PTAs would at least help to improve transparency. 
  Many would argue that trade and investment decisions are increasingly being 
made by the same players in the market, and therefore liberalizing one policy area 
without the other is not optimal. Provisions for liberalization of flows of capital, 
including human capital, would allow MNCs to establish production based on relative 
costs and would encourage FDI flows into those locations that are recognized as having 
all necessary ingredients to be part of production sharing.  
 
  In summary, PTAs cannot be identified as delivering (deep) integration. In India 
that is definitely not the case; despite an avalanche of PTAs signed in the past five years, 
only three have potential for creating environments for IPNs. The positive news is that all 
three agreements belong to the most recent vintage of PTAs, which might signal a change 
in a general policy towards regional integration, from shallow and protectionist to deep 
and trade enhancing. In addition, all partners in these agreements (Japan, the Republic of 
Korea and Singapore) are important players in Asian production networks. However, the 
fact cannot be ignored that trade and investment areas are not the only source of obstacles 
for IPNs. It is also important to note that there are many more factors involved in 
establishing and the functioning of production networks and in integrating producers 
from different markets, including having good physical connectivity, efficient 
infrastructural services and institutions for the protection of intellectual property (cf. 
Bhattacharyay and De, 2009). 
 
  The empirical literature indicates that improving the depth of PTAs would 
increase the production network trade, especially so in the sectors that are regulation-
intensive. For example, a 1 per cent rise in the depth of integration increases trade in 
automotive parts and ITC products by 81 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively (Orifice 
and Rocha, 2011). For India, both these sectors are at the top of industrial development 
priorities. Thus, it would not make sense to exclude any of these products from the lists 
of covered goods for tariff cuts as appeared to be the case for car parts in the past.  
    
  Furthermore, countries already participating in IPNs are more likely to be signing 
deep PTAs subsequently, as IPNs create awareness and demand for them. This appears to 
be the case in East Asia, where IPNs were established as a consequence of the region 
undergoing de facto integration (that is, by market forces rather than contractual 
obligations). According to Orifice and Rocha (2011), the almost five times higher chance 
that a deep PTA would be signed between countries at different levels of development was 






While there is a clear need to expand trade and deepen economic and other 
relations among developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region, evidence from empirical 
research finds that the agreements between countries at a similar and relatively low level 
of development remain shallow and fail to provide support to operation of production 
networks. On the other hand, if shallow agreements are the only possibility, it is better to 
have them than nothing. Shallow trade agreements, while rarely having concrete trade 
enlargement effects, might work towards developing trust and thus could help to generate 
trade in the long term. It is also helpful to know that countries that increased trade with 
partners with whom they had no preferential trade agreements have not been exceptions 
in this region (see APTIAD, 2011).  
 
In addition to contributing relatively little towards the deeper integration of India, 
its current trade agreements are also disappointing in terms of utilization by traders 
(exporting and importing firms).
102 In principle, utilization of preferences is inversely 
proportionate to the complexity of the rules of origin, given the margin of preference – 
the more complex the rules of origin, the more expensive the compliance, resulting in low 
propensity to use the preferences. Frequently, traders just use so-called “most-favoured-
nation” rules of origin without using preferential market access. This practice may result 
in agreements that do not effectively increase trade. This is a serious problem, but it is 
difficult to provide much more than anecdotal evidence in this regard as data are not 
readily available.  
                                                            
 
102 Jha (2011) estimated the utility of India-Sri Lanka FTA, which represents one of the more effective of 
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